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Presuppositions of Frame Theory in the History of Philosophy

How do we conceive of the world? How does our mind represent objects, events, properties, relations, species and genera? Are the structures of our cognitive reference to the world analogous to those of our language? And what does the way we think and talk about things in the world tell us about the things themselves? The theory of frames represents a current approach to answering these questions. It assumes that cognitive and linguistic representations of everything from simple objects to complex states of affairs occur in recursive attribute-value structures – called frames – that reflect the ontological structures of reality. But is this model of the relationship between thought, language, and reality actually new – or merely a modern formulation of ideas steeped in tradition? If the latter, does frame theory inherit the well-known methodological and epistemological problems of its predecessor theories, or does it perhaps even point the way to their solution? These questions are pursued by Prof. Dr. Christoph Kann, PD Dr. David Hommen and Frauke Albersmeier M.A. from the Department of Philosophy in the DFG-funded research project "Presuppositions of Frame Theory in the History of Philosophy."

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